Is the Learjet 60 still safe to fly?

People ask whether the Learjet 60 is safe because one crashed in Palm Beach County on November 1, 2026, and killed nine people. That question can’t be answered from one accident, and the cause of that one has not been determined. It can be answered from the type’s record, and the record is unusually well documented.

The Learjet 60 has two known weaknesses, and both came to light the hard way: its tires were sensitive to underinflation, and its thrust reversers could, after certain failures, produce forward thrust when the pilots had selected reverse. A fatal crash in 2008 exposed both. The FAA then made the fixes compulsory in three airworthiness directives. Whether a particular Learjet 60 is safe today depends on whether those fixes have been made, how it is maintained and who flies it, and you can ask about all three.

The short version

• No official accident rate exists for the Learjet 60. The FAA does not publish hours flown by aircraft type, so there is nothing to divide accidents by. Anyone who quotes you a rate for the type has estimated it.
• The type’s weaknesses are documented. NTSB report AAR-10/02, on the 2008 Columbia, South Carolina, overrun, found tire underinflation and a thrust reverser design flaw, and it criticised the FAA’s certification of that design.
• The fixes are compulsory. FAA directives in 2010, 2013 and 2020 required tire pressure checks, landing gear modifications and a voice warning for thrust reverser faults. Under 14 CFR 39.7, flying an aircraft that does not comply with an applicable directive is a violation.
• The Palm Beach crash is unexplained. The NTSB has not stated a cause, and this page does not guess at one.
• The aircraft matters less than its operator. Ask who holds operational control, how the aircraft is maintained, and whether the directives are recorded as complied with.

Why is there no accident rate for the Learjet 60?

A rate needs two numbers, and only one of them is public for a single aircraft type. The NTSB records each accident with the aircraft make and model, so you can count Learjet 60 accidents. What you cannot get from the FAA is how many hours the Learjet 60 fleet has flown, which you need to turn a count into accidents per 100,000 hours.

The official rates in private jet accident statistics are grouped by operating rule, not by aircraft: on-demand charter under Part 135, general aviation under Part 91, airlines under Part 121. That is the honest limit of the public data. A type with many accidents may simply have flown a great deal. A type with few may have flown very little. Without the hours, a count of crashes does not tell you which.

What a count can show is a pattern: the same failure turning up in more than one accident. The Learjet 60 has one, and the NTSB wrote it down.

What did the 2008 Columbia crash show?

On September 19, 2008, a Learjet 60 overran the runway at Columbia Metropolitan Airport, South Carolina, during a rejected takeoff on a Part 135 charter flight. The captain, the first officer and two passengers were killed, and two other passengers were seriously injured. The NTSB adopted its report, AAR-10/02, on April 6, 2010. Its probable cause:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the operator’s inadequate maintenance of the airplane’s tires, which resulted in multiple tire failures during takeoff roll due to severe underinflation, and the captain’s execution of a rejected takeoff (RTO) after V1, which was inconsistent with her training and standard operating procedures.

Two things in that finding are worth stopping on.

The tires were the operator’s failure. The NTSB found that no facility that handled the aircraft in the 12 days before the accident had serviced its main tires, and the operator’s director of maintenance estimated the pressures may not have been checked for about three weeks. Underinflation, the report notes, “generally cannot be detected visually”. The maintenance manual already said to check the pressure before the first flight of every day. The information existed, and the operator didn’t follow it.

The design made it worse. The NTSB listed four contributing factors. The first was “deficiencies in Learjet’s design of and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) certification of the Learjet Model 60’s thrust reverser system, which permitted the failure of critical systems in the wheel well area to result in uncommanded forward thrust that increased the severity of the accident.” Put simply, debris from the failed tires damaged switches in the wheel well, the thrust reversers stowed themselves, and the engines pushed the aircraft forward while the crew had selected reverse.

The second contributing factor is the uncomfortable one: Learjet’s safety analysis and the FAA’s review of it “failed to detect and correct the thrust reverser and wheel well design deficiencies after a 2001 uncommanded forward thrust accident”.

What happened in 2001?

On January 14, 2001, a Learjet 60 hit deer on landing at Troy, Alabama, and ran off the end of the runway. The pilots were critically injured. They reported that the thrust reversers failed to work. Investigators found the reversers stowed and the squat switch on the left main landing gear damaged. The squat switch tells the aircraft’s systems it is on the ground. A sound study of the cockpit voice recording showed the engines speeding up beyond what reverse thrust could produce.

Learjet responded with a flight manual change in 2003 and, in 2005, a service bulletin (SB 60-78-7) that added the wheel speed sensors to the thrust reverser logic as a second ground signal. New aircraft from serial number 60-277 had it fitted at the factory. For aircraft already flying, the NTSB records that the modification “was not required by the FAA”. The NTSB’s view, in 2010, was that this response had not gone far enough.

What has been fixed since?

Everything the NTSB found has been addressed, though not all at once, and the full fix took twelve years. The timeline below the article sets out each step, its source, and whether it was compulsory.

Tires (2008 to 2010). In October 2008 Learjet told operators to check cold tire pressure before the first flight of each day. The FAA issued a safety alert in February 2009. In March 2009 Learjet added a limitation to the flight manual: nose and main tire pressures “must be checked within 96 hours (not flight hours) prior to takeoff”. AD 2010-11-11 made that change mandatory in June 2010.

The squat switch (2013). AD 2013-13-09 required new hydraulic tubes, a new squat switch bracket and modified wire harnesses, to protect the wiring that had failed at Troy and Columbia. In its proposal the FAA said that doing this work could end the repeat 96-hour tire check.

The voice warning (2020). AD 2020-11-04, effective June 25, 2020, applies to every Learjet 60, serial numbers 60-001 through 60-430. In the FAA’s words, it was prompted by “a reverse thrust command accelerating the airplane instead of decelerating the airplane because the thrust reverser doors were stowed instead of deployed.” It requires a Thrust Reverser Voice Command Warning System, which tells the crew aloud when the reversers are not where they selected. The deadline was 1,200 flight hours or 48 months, whichever came first, so every Learjet 60 still flying should have had it fitted by June 2024.

A directive is not advice. Under 14 CFR 39.7, “anyone who operates a product that does not meet the requirements of an applicable airworthiness directive is in violation.” Compliance with each directive is recorded in the aircraft’s maintenance records.

Does the Learjet 60’s age matter?

Age on its own is not a safety finding. The NTSB does not report accident rates by aircraft age. The rules do not retire an aircraft at a certain age. They require it to be inspected and kept to its directives for as long as it flies.

What age does change:

• Support depends on the manufacturer. Bombardier delivered the last new Learjet, a Learjet 75, in March 2022, and said parts and service support for the fleet would continue. The FAA issued a directive for the 60 as recently as 2020.
• The cost of upkeep rises. An older aircraft has more inspections behind it and more parts reaching their limits. An owner who stops paying for that is the risk, and it does not show from the outside.
• Equipment varies by airframe. Older aircraft may lack features a newer jet has as standard, unless an owner has paid to add them. The squat switch modification in SB 60-78-7 is one example: fitted at the factory from serial number 60-277, and an optional retrofit on earlier aircraft until the 2013 directive.

Every Learjet 60 is now at least about 14 years old. The question to ask about one isn’t its age. It is whether its records show the work that keeps an aircraft that age airworthy.

How is a charter Learjet 60 maintained?

A Learjet 60 has eight passenger seats or fewer, so under 14 CFR 135.411(a)(1) a charter operator maintains it under Parts 91 and 43 plus the Part 135 maintenance sections. Section 135.421 adds that the operator must follow “the manufacturer’s recommended maintenance programs, or a program approved by the Administrator” for the engines and emergency equipment. As a turbojet with more than one engine, it must also be inspected under an inspection program the operator has selected, as 91.409(e) requires.

Columbia shows the limit of that. The aircraft was on a Part 135 certificate, and the maintenance manual already said to check tire pressure before the first flight of the day. The rules were sound. The operator did not follow them. That is why the useful questions are about the operator, not the airframe.

What about the Palm Beach crash?

It is unexplained. The Learjet 60 that crashed in Palm Beach County on November 1, 2026, was flying from Austin, Texas, to North Eleuthera in the Bahamas. All nine people aboard died. The NTSB is investigating (case ERA27MA026). It has said there were indications the aircraft was breaking up before impact and that weather is a major focus, and it has not determined a cause. Its preliminary report is expected around the start of December 2026. On November 3 it said it had found most of the jet’s left elevator, in three pieces, 1.3 to 3.8 miles from the crash site; what that finding does and does not show is set out on its own page.

Nothing published so far connects that accident to the tire or thrust reverser history above, which concerned takeoffs and landings, not flight at altitude. Our page on what is known about the Palm Beach crash is updated when the NTSB publishes.

What should you ask about a specific Learjet 60?

The same questions as for any charter aircraft, with one addition for this type:

1. Who is the operator, and is this aircraft on its certificate? The operator named in the quote should hold a Part 135 certificate with this aircraft listed in its operations specifications. Part 91 vs Part 135 explains why that matters.
2. What is the operator’s audit rating? ARGUS, Wyvern and IS-BAO audit operators, not aircraft types. What the safety ratings mean sets out what each one checks.
3. Are the Learjet 60 directives complied with? Specifically AD 2010-11-11, AD 2013-13-09 and AD 2020-11-04. An operator should be able to confirm this from the aircraft’s records.
4. Who are the two pilots, and how are they trained? The Learjet 60 needs a pilot and a copilot. Ask whether both are trained on the type in a simulator and how recently.

If any answer is vague, ask for a different aircraft. A quote names the aircraft type, and you can turn it down before you sign.

How Jake works

Jake confirms that the operator holds an ARGUS Gold or Platinum rating before quoting it, names the operator and the aircraft type on every quote, and deals with the certificate holder. This office still quotes the Learjet 60 when the operator and the aircraft pass the checks above. Since the Palm Beach crash there is often room to negotiate on price, which Jake will ask about on your behalf. If you would rather not fly on a particular type, say so with the request and the quote will leave it out.

Sources

• NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report AAR-10/02, Learjet 60 N999LJ, Columbia, South Carolina, adopted April 6, 2010. Probable cause, contributing factors, the 2001 Troy accident, SB 60-78-7 and the 2008 to 2009 safety actions.
• FAA, AD 2020-11-04, 85 FR 30837, May 21, 2020. It also cites AD 2010-11-11 and AD 2013-13-09.
• FAA, proposed AD for the Learjet 60 squat switch, 78 FR 18531, March 27, 2013.
• eCFR: 14 CFR 39.7, 135.411, 135.421, 91.409, 295.50.
• AIN, Bombardier delivers final production Learjet, March 28, 2022.
• NTSB, investigation ERA27MA026.